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"Diggers on the Hill"
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THE IRON FIST BEHIND THE INVISIBLE HAND
Corporate Capitalism As a State-Guaranteed System of Privilege
by Kevin A. Carson
INTRODUCTION. Manorialism, commonly, is recognized to have been founded by robbery and
usurpation; a ruling class established itself by force, and then compelled the peasantry to work
for the profit of their lords. But no system of exploitation, including capitalism, has ever been
created by the action of a free market. Capitalism was founded on an act of robbery as massive as
feudalism. It has been sustained to the present by continual state intervention to protect its system
of privilege, without which its survival is unimaginable.
The current structure of capital ownership and organization of production in our so-called
"market" economy, reflects coercive state intervention prior to and extraneous to the market.
From the outset of the industrial revolution, what is nostalgically called "laissez-faire" was
in fact a system of continuing state intervention to subsidize accumulation, guarantee privilege,
and maintain work discipline.
Most such intervention is tacitly assumed by mainstream right-libertarians as part of a
"market" system. Although a few intellectually honest ones like Rothbard and Hess were willing
to look into the role of coercion in creating capitalism, the Chicago school and Randroids take
existing property relations and class power as a given. Their ideal "free market" is merely the
current system minus the progressive regulatory and welfare state--i.e., nineteenth century
robber baron capitalism.
But genuine markets have a value for the libertarian left, and we shouldn't concede the term
to our enemies. In fact, capitalism--a system of power in which ownership and control are divorced
from labor--could not survive in a free market. As a mutualist anarchist, I believe that
expropriation of surplus value--i.e., capitalism--cannot occur without state coercion to maintain
the privilege of usurer, landlord, and capitalist. It was for this reason that the free market
anarchist Benjamin Tucker--from whom right-libertarians selectively borrow--regarded himself
as a libertarian socialist.
It is beyond my ability or purpose here to describe a world where a true market system could
have developed without such state intervention. A world in which peasants had held onto their
land and property was widely distributed, capital was freely available to laborers through mutual
banks, productive technology was freely available in every country without patents, and every
people was free to develop locally without colonial robbery, is beyond our imagination. But it
would have been a world of decentralized, small-scale production for local use, owned and
controlled by those who did the work--as different from our world as day from night, or freedom
from slavery.
THE SUBSIDY OF HISTORY. Accordingly, the single biggest subsidy to modern corporate
capitalism is the subsidy of history, by which capital was originally accumulated in a few hands,
and labor was deprived of access to the means of production and forced to sell itself on the
buyer's terms. The current system of concentrated capital ownership and large-scale corporate
organization is the direct beneficiary of that original structure of power and property ownership,
which has perpetuated itself over the centuries.
For capitalism as we know it to come about, it was essential first of all for labor to be
separated from property. Marxians and other radical economists commonly refer to the process
as "primitive accumulation." "What the capitalist system demanded was... a degraded and
almost servile condition of the mass of the people, the transformation of them into mercenaries,
and of their means of labor into capital." That meant expropriating the land, "to which
the [peasantry] has the same feudal rights as the lord himself." [Marx, "Chapter
27: The Expropriation," Capital vol. 1]
To grasp the enormity of the process, we must understand that the nobility's rights in
land under the manorial economy were entirely a feudal legal fiction deriving from conquest.
The peasants who cultivated the land of England in 1650 were descendants of those who had
occupied it since time immemorial. By any standard of morality, it was their property in
every sense of the word. The armies of William the Conqueror, by no right other than force,
had compelled these peasant proprietors to pay rent on their own land.
J. L. and Barbara Hammond treated the sixteenth century village and open field system
as a survival of the free peasant society of Anglo-Saxon times, with landlordism superimposed
on it. The gentry saw surviving peasant rights as a hindrance to progress and efficient
peasant resistance. Hence the agricultural community was "taken to pieces ... and
reconstructed in the manner in which a dictator reconstructs a free government."
[The Village Labourer 27-28, 35-36].
When the Tudors gave expropriated monastic lands to the nobility, the latter "drove
out, en masse, the hereditary sub tenants and threw their holdings into one." [Marx,
"The Expropriation"]. This stolen land, about a fifth of the arable land of England,
was the first large-scale expropriation of the peasantry.
Another major theft of peasant land was the "reform" of land law by the seventeenth
century Restoration Parliament. The aristocracy abolished feudal tenures and converted
their own estate in the land, until then "only a feudal title," into "rights
of modern private property." In the process, they abolished the tenure rights of
copyholders. Copyholders were de jure tenants under feudal law, but once they paid a
negligible quit-rent fixed by custom, the land was theirs to sell or bequeath. In
substance copyhold tenure was a manorial equivalent of freehold; but since it derived
from custom it was enforceable only in the manor courts. Under the "reform," tenants
in copyhold became tenants at-will, who could be evicted or charged whatever rent
their lord saw fit [Marx, "The Expropriation..."].
Another form of expropriation, which began in late medieval times and increased
drastically in the eighteenth century, was the enclosure of commons--in which, again,
the peasants communally had as absolute a right of property as any defended by today's
"property rights" advocates. Not counting enclosures before 1700, the Hammonds
estimated total enclosures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at a sixth or
a fifth of the arable land in England [Village Labourer 42]. E. J. Hobsbawm
and George Rude estimated enclosures between 1750 and 1850 alone as transforming "
something like one quarter of the cultivated acreage from open field, common land,
meadow or waste into private fields...." [Captain Swing 27].
The ruling classes saw the peasants' right in commons as a source of economic
independence from capitalist and landlord, and thus a threat to be destroyed.
Enclosure eliminated "a dangerous centre of indiscipline" and compelled workers
to sell their labor on the masters' terms. Arthur Young, a Lincolnshire gentleman,
described the commons as "a breeding-ground for 'barbarians,' 'nursing up a mischievous
race of people'." "[E]very one but an idiot knows," he wrote, "that the lower classes
must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious." The Commercial and
Agricultural Magazine warned in 1800 that leaving the laborer "possessed of
more land than his family can cultivate in the evenings" meant that "the farmer
can no longer depend on him for constant work." [Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class, 219-220, 358]. Sir Richard Price commented on the conversion
of self-sufficient proprietors into "a body of men who earn their subsistence by
working for others." There would, "perhaps, be more labour, because there will
be more compulsion to it." [Marx, "The Expropriation...."].
Marx cited parliamentary "acts of enclosure" as evidence that the commons, far from
being the "private property of the great landlords who have taken the place of the
feudal lords," actually required "a parliamentary coup detat... for its
transformation into private property." ["The Expropriation...."]. The process
of primitive accumulation, in all its brutality, was summed up by the same author:
these new freedmen [i.e. former serfs] became sellers of themselves only after
they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of
existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their
expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire
["Chapter 26: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation," Capital Vol. 1].
Even then, the working class was not sufficiently powerless. The state had to
regulate the movement of labor, serve as a labor exchange on behalf of capitalists,
and maintain order. The system of parish regulation of the movement of people, under
the poor laws and vagrancy laws, resembled the internal passport system of South
Africa, or the reconstruction era Black Codes. It "had the same effect on the
English agricultural labourer," Marx wrote, "as the edict of the Tartar Boris
Godunov on the Russian peasantry." ["The Expropriation..."] Adam Smith
ventured that there was "scarce a poor man in England of forty years of age...
who has not in some part of his life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this
ill-contrived law of settlements." [Wealth of Nations 61].
The state maintained work discipline by keeping laborers from voting with their
feet. It was hard to persuade parish authorities to grant a man a certificate
entitling him to move to another parish to seek work. Workers were forced to stay
put and bargain for work in a buyer's market [Smith 60-61].
At first glance this would seem to be inconvenient for parishes with a labor
shortage [Smith 60]. Factories were built at sources of water power, generally
removed from centers of population. Thousands of workers were needed to be imported
from far away. But the state saved the day by setting itself up as a middleman in
providing labor-poor parishes with cheap surplus labor from elsewhere, depriving
workers of the ability to bargain for better terms. A considerable trade arose in
child laborers who were in no position to bargain in any case [the Hammonds, The
Town Labourer 1:146].
Relief "was seldom bestowed without the parish claiming the exclusive right
of disposing, at their pleasure, of all the children of the person receiving
relief," in the words of the Committee on Parish Apprentices, 1815 [the Hammonds,
Town Labourer 1:44, 147]. Even when Poor Law commissioners encouraged migration
to labor-poor parishes, they discouraged adult men and "Preference was given to
'widows with large families of children or handicraftsmen... with large families.
'" In addition, the availability of cheap labor from the poor-law commissioners was
deliberately used to drive down wages; farmers would discharge their own day-laborers
and instead apply to the overseer for help [Thompson 223-224].
Although the Combination Laws theoretically applied to masters as well as workmen,
in practice they were not enforced against the latter [Smith 61; the Hammonds, Town
Labourer 1:74]. "A Journeyman Cotton Spinner"--a pamphleteer quoted by
E. P. Thompson [pp. 199-202]--described "an abominable combination existing amongst
the masters," in which workers who had left their masters because of disagreement
over wages were effectively blacklisted. The Combination Laws required suspects to
answer interrogations on oath, empowered magistrates to give summary judgment, and
allowed summary forfeiture of funds accumulated to aid the families of strikers
[Town Labourer 123-127]. And the laws setting maximum rates of pay amounted to
a state enforced system of combination for the masters. As Adam Smith put it,
"[w]henever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between the masters
and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters." [p. 61].
The working class lifestyle under the factory system, with its new forms of social
control, was a radical break with the past. It involved drastic loss of control over
their own work. The seventeenth century work calendar was still heavily influenced by
medieval custom. Although there were long days in spurts between planting and harvest,
intermittent periods of light work and the proliferation of saints days combined to
reduce average work-time well below our own. And the pace of work was generally
determined by the sun or the biological rhythms of the laborer, who got up after
a decent night's sleep, and sat down to rest when he felt like it. The cottager who
had access to common land, even when he wanted extra income from wage labor, could take
work on a casual basis and then return to working for himself. This was an unacceptable
degree of independence from a capitalist standpoint.
In the modern world most people have to adapt themselves to some kind of discipline,
and to observe other' people's timetables, ...or work under other people's orders, but
we have to remember that the population that was flung into the brutal rhythm of the
factory had earned its living in relative freedom, and that the discipline of the early
factory was particularly savage.... No economist of the day, in estimating the gains or
losses of factory employment, ever allowed for the strain and violence that a man suffered
in his feelings when he passed from a life in which he could smoke or eat, or dig or sleep
as he pleased, to one in which somebody turned the key on him, and for fourteen hours he had
not even the right to whistle. It was like entering the airless and laughterless life of
a prison [the Hammonds, Town Labourer 1:33-34].
The factory system could not have been imposed on workers without first depriving
them of alternatives, and forcibly denying access to any source of economic independence.
No unbroken human being, with a sense of freedom or dignity, would have submitted to factory
discipline. Stephen Marglin compared the nineteenth century textile factory, staffed by pauper
children bought at the workhouse slave market, to Roman brick and pottery factories which were
manned by slaves. In Rome, factory production was exceptional in manufactures dominated by freemen.
The factory system, throughout history, has been possible only with a work force deprived of any
viable alternative.
The surviving facts... strongly suggest that whether work was organized along factory lines
was in Roman times determined, not by technological considerations, but by the relative power
of the two producing classes. Freedmen and citizens had sufficient power to maintain a guild
organization. Slaves had no power--and ended up in factories ["What Do Bosses Do?"].
The problem with the old "putting out" system, in which cottage workers produced textiles
on a contractual basis, was that it only eliminated worker control of the product. The factory
system, by eliminating worker control of the production process, had the advantage of discipline
and supervision, with workers organized under an overseer.
the origin and success of the factory lay not in technological superiority, but in the
substitution of the capitalist's for the worker's control of the work process and the quantity
of output, in the change in the workman's choice from one of how much to work and produce,
based on his preferences for leisure and goods, to one of whether or not to work at all,
which of course is hardly much of a choice.
Marglin took Adam Smith's classic example of the division of labor in pin-making, and stood
it on its head. The increased efficiency resulted, not from the division of labor as such, but
from dividing and sequencing the process into separate tasks in order to reduce set-up time.
This could have been accomplished by a single cottage workman separating the various tasks and
then performing them sequentially (i.e., drawing out the wire for an entire run of production,
then straightening it, then cutting it, etc.).
without specialization, the capitalist had no essential role to play in the production
process. If each producer could himself integrate the component tasks of pin manufacture
into a marketable product, he would soon discover that he had no need to deal with the
market for pins through the intermediation of the putter-outer. He could sell directly and
appropriate to himself the profit that the capitalist derived from mediating between the
producer and the market.
This principle is at the center of the history of industrial technology for the last
two hundred years. Even given the necessity of factories for some forms of large-scale,
capital-intensive manufacturing, there is usually a choice between alternate productive
technologies within the factory. Industry has consistently chosen technologies which
de-skill workers and shift decision-making upward into the managerial hierarchy. As long
ago as 1835, Dr. Andrew Ure (the ideological grandfather of Taylorism and Fordism), argued
that the more skilled the workman, "the more self-willed and... the less fit a component
of a mechanical system" he became. The solution was to eliminate processes which required
"peculiar dexterity and steadiness of hand... from the cunning workman" and replace
them by a "mechanism, so self-regulating, that a child may superintend it."
[Philosophy of Manufactures, in Thompson 360]. And the principle has been followed
throughout the twentieth century. William Lazonick, David Montgomery, David Noble, and
Katherine Stone have produced an excellent body of work on this theme. Even though corporate
experiments in worker self-management increase morale and productivity, and reduce injuries
and absenteeism, beyond the hopes of management, they are usually abandoned out of fear of
loss of control.
Christopher Lasch, in his foreword to Noble's America by Design, characterized
the process of de-skilling in this way:
The capitalist, having expropriated the worker's property, gradually expropriated his
technical knowledge as well, asserting his own mastery over production....
The expropriation of the worker's technical knowledge had as a logical consequence the
growth of modern management, in which technical knowledge came to be concentrated. As the
scientific management movement split up production into its component procedures, reducing
the worker to an appendage of the machine, a great expansion of technical and supervisory
personnel took place in order to oversee the productive process as a whole [pp. xi-xii].
The expropriation of the peasantry and imposition of the factory labor system was not
accomplished without resistance; the workers knew exactly what was being done to them and
what they had lost. During the 1790s, when rhetoric from the Jacobins and Tom Paine were
widespread among the radicalized working class, the rulers of "the cradle of liberty" lived
in terror that the country would be swept by revolution. The system of police state controls
over the population resembled an alien occupation regime. The Hammonds referred to correspondence
between north-country magistrates and the Home Office, in which the law was frankly treated
"as an instrument not of justice but of repression," and the working classes "
appear[ed]... conspicuously as a helot population." [Town Labourer 72]
... in the light of the Home Office papers, ...none of the personal rights attaching
to Englishmen possessed any reality for the working classes. The magistrates and their
clerks recognized no limit to their powers over the freedom and the movements of working
men. The Vagrancy Laws seemed to supercede the entire charter of an Englishman's liberties.
They were used to put into prison any man or woman of the working class who seemed to the
magistrate an inconvenient or disturbing character. They offered the easiest and most
expeditious way of proceeding against any one who tried to collect money for the families
of locked-out workmen, or to disseminate literature that the magistrates thought
undesirable [Ibid. 80].
Peel's "bobbies"--professional law enforcement--replaced the posse comitatus system
because the latter was inadequate to control a population of increasingly disaffected
workmen. In the time of the Luddite and other disturbances, crown officials warned that
"to apply the Watch and Ward Act would be to put arms into the hands of the most
powerfully disaffected." At the outset of the wars with France, Pitt ended the
practice of quartering the army in alehouses, mixed with the general population. Instead,
the manufacturing districts were covered with barracks, as "purely a matter of
police." The manufacturing areas "came to resemble a country under military
occupation." [Ibid. 91-92].
Pitt's police state was supplemented by quasi-private vigilantism, in the time-honored
tradition of blackshirts and death squads ever since. For example the "Association for the
Protection of Property against Republicans and Levellers"--an anti-Jacobin association of
gentry and mill-owners conducted house-to-house searches and organized Guy Fawkes-style
effigy burnings against Paine; "Church and King" mobs terrorised suspected radicals [Chapter
Five, "Planting the Liberty Tree," in Thompson].
Thompson characterized this system of control as "political and social apartheid,"
and argued that "the revolution which did not happen in England was fully as
devastating" as the one that did happen in France [pp. 197-198].
Finally, the state aided the growth of manufactures through mercantilism. Modern
exponents of the "free market" generally treat mercantilism as a "misguided" attempt
to promote some unified national interest, adopted out of sincere ignorance of economic
principles. In fact, the architects of mercantilism knew exactly what they were doing.
Mercantilism was extremely efficient for its real purpose: making wealthy manufacturing
interests rich at the expense of everyone else. Adam Smith consistently attacked
mercantilism, not as a product of economic error, but as a quite intelligent attempt by
powerful interests to enrich themselves through the coercive power of the state.
British manufacturing was created by state
intervention to shut out foreign goods, give British shipping
a monopoly of foreign commerce, and stamp out foreign
competition by force. As an example of the latter, British
authorities in India destroyed the Bengalese textile industry,
makers of the highest quality fabric in the world. Although
they had not adopted steam-driven methods of production, there
is a real possibility that they would have done so, had India
remained politically and economically independent. The once
prosperous territory of Bengal is today occupied by Bangladesh
and the Calcutta area [Chomsky, World Orders Old and
New].
The American, German and Japanese industrial
systems were created by the same mercantilist policies, with
massive tariffs on industrial goods. "Free trade" was adopted
by safely established industrial powers, who used
"laissez-faire" as an ideological weapon to prevent potential
rivals from following the same path of industrialization.
Capitalism has never been established by means of the free
market, or even by the primary action of the bourgeoisie. It
has always been established by a revolution from above,
imposed by a pre-capitalist ruling class. In England, it was
the landed aristocracy; in France, Napoleon II's bureaucracy;
in Germany, the Junkers; in Japan, the Meiji. In America, the
closest approach to a "natural" bourgeois evolution,
industrialization was carried out by a mercantilist
aristocracy of Federalist shipping magnates and landlords
[Harrington, Twilight of Capitalism].
Romantic medievalists like Chesterton and
Belloc described the process in the high middle ages by which
serfdom had gradually withered away, and the peasants had
transformed themselves into de facto freeholders who paid a
nominal quit-rent. The feudal class system was disintegrating
and being replaced by a much more libertarian and less
exploitative one. Immanuel Wallerstein argued that the likely
outcome would have been "a system of relatively equal
small-scale producers, further flattening out the
aristocracies and decentralizing the political
structures." By 1650 the trend had been reversed, and
there was "a reasonably high level of continuity between
the families that had been high strata" in 1450 and 1650.
Capitalism, far from being "the overthrow of a backward
aristocracy by a progressive bourgeoisie," "was brought into
existence by a landed aristocracy which transformed itself
into a bourgeoisie because the old system was disintegrating."
[Historical Capitalism 41-42, 105-106]. This is
echoed in part by Arno Mayer [The Persistence of the Old
Regime], who argued for continuity between the landed
aristocracy and the capitalist ruling class.
The process by which the high medieval
civilization of peasant proprietors, craft guilds and free
cities was overthrown, was vividly described by Kropotkin
[Mutual Aid 225]. Before the invention of gunpowder,
the free cities repelled royal armies more often than not, and
won their independence from feudal dues. And these cities
often made common cause with peasants in their struggles to
control the land. The absolutist state and the capitalist
revolution it imposed became possible only when artillery
could reduce fortified cities with a high degree of
efficiency, and the king could make war on his own people. And
in the aftermath of this conquest, the Europe of William
Morris was left devastated, depopulated, and miserable.
Peter Tosh had a song called "Four Hundred
Years." Although the white working class has suffered nothing
like the brutality of black slavery, there has nevertheless
been a "four hundred years" of oppression for all of us under
the system of state capitalism established in the seventeenth
century. Ever since the birth of the first states six thousand
years ago, political coercion has allowed one ruling class or
another to live off other people's labor. But since the
seventeenth century the system of power has become
increasingly conscious, unified, and global in scale. The
current system of transnational state capitalism, without
rival since the collapse of the soviet bureaucratic class
system, is a direct outgrowth of the seizure of power "four
hundred years" ago. Orwell had it backwards. The past is a
"boot smashing a human face." Whether the future is more of
the same depends on what we do now.
IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY. Ideological hegemony is the process by which the
exploited come to view the world through a conceptual framework provided to them
by their exploiters. It acts first of all to conceal class conflict and exploitation
behind a smokescreen of "national unity" or "general welfare." Those who point to
the role of the state as guarantor of class privilege are denounced, in theatrical
tones of moral outrage, for "class warfare." If anyone is so unpardonably "extremist"
as to describe the massive foundation of state intervention and subsidy upon which
corporate capitalism rests, he is sure to be rebuked for "Marxist class war
rhetoric" (Bob Novak), or "robber baron rhetoric"
(Treasury Secretary O'Neill).
The ideological framework of "national unity"
is taken to the point that "this country," "society," or "our
system of government" is set up as an object of gratitude for
"the freedoms we enjoy." Only the most unpatriotic notice that
our liberties, far from being granted to us by a generous and
benevolent government, were won by past resistance against the
state. Charters and bills of rights were not grants from the
state, but were forced on the state from below.
If our liberties belong to us by right of
birth, as a moral fact of nature, it follows that we owe the
state no debt of gratitude for not violating them, any more
than we owe our thanks to another individual for refraining
from robbing or killing us. Simple logic implies that, rather
than being grateful to "the freest country on earth," we
should raise hell every time it infringes on our liberty.
After all, thats how we got our liberty in the first place.
When another individual puts his hand in our pocket to enrich
himself at our expense, our natural instinct is to resist. But
thanks to patriotism, the ruling class is able to transform
their hand in our pocket into "society" or "our country."
The religion of national unity is most
pathological in regard to "defense" and foreign policy. The
manufacture of foreign crisis and war hysteria has been used
since the beginning of history to suppress threats to class
rule. The crooked politicians may work for the "special
interests" domestically, but when those same politicians
engineer a war it is a matter of loyalty to "our country."
The Chairman of the JCS, in discussing the
"defense" posture, will refer with a straight face to
"national security threats" faced by the U. S., and describe
the armed forces of some official enemy like China as far
beyond "legitimate defensive requirements." The quickest way
to put oneself beyond the pale is to point out that all these
"threats" involve what some country on the other side of the
world is doing within a hundred miles of its own border.
Another offense against fatherland worship is to judge the
actions of the United States, in its global operations to keep
the Third World safe for ITT and United Fruit Company, by the
same standard of "legitimate defensive requirements" applied
to China.
In the official ideology, America's wars by
definition are always fought "for our liberties," to "defend
our country," or in the smarmy world of Maudlin Albright, a
selfless desire to promote "peace and freedom" in the world.
To suggest that the real defenders of our liberties took up
arms against the government, or that the national security
state is a greater threat to our liberties than any foreign
enemy we have ever faced, is unforgivable. Above all, good
Americans don't notice all those military advisers teaching
death squads how to hack off the faces of union organizers and
leave them in ditches, or to properly use pliers on a
dissident's testicles. War crimes are only committed by
defeated powers. (But as the Nazis learned in 1945, unemployed
war criminals can usually find work with the new hegemonic
power.)
After a century and a half of patriotic
indoctrination by the statist education system, Americans have
thoroughly internalized the "little red schoolhouse" version
of American history. This authoritarian piety is so
diametrically opposed to the beliefs of those who took up arms
in the Revolution that the citizenry has largely forgotten
what it means to be American. In fact, the authentic
principles of Americanism have been stood on their head. Two
hundred years ago, standing armies were feared as a threat to
liberty and a breeding ground for authoritarian personalities;
conscription was associated with the tyranny of Cromwell; wage
labor was thought to be inconsistent with the independent
spirit of a free citizen. Today, two hundred years later,
Americans have been so Prussianized by sixty years of a
garrison state and "wars" against one internal enemy or
another, that they are conditioned to genuflect at the sight
of a uniform. Draft dodgers are equivalent to child molesters.
Most people work for some centralized corporate or state
bureaucracy, where as a matter of course they are expected to
obey orders from superiors, work under constant surveillance,
and even piss in a cup on command.
During wartime, it becomes unpatriotic to
criticize or question the government and dissent is identified
with disloyalty. Absolute faith and obedience to authority is
a litmus test of "Americanism." Foreign war is a very useful
tool for manipulating the popular mind and keeping the
domestic population under control. War is the easiest way to
shift vast, unaccountable new powers to the State. People
are most uncritically obedient at the very time they need to
be most vigilant.
The greatest irony is that, in a country
founded by revolution, "Americanism" is defined as respecting
authority and resisting "subversion." The Revolution was a
revolution indeed, in which the domestic political
institutions of the colonies were forcibly overthrown. It was,
in many times and places, a civil war between classes. But as
Voltairine de Cleyre wrote a century ago in "Anarchism and
American Traditions," the version in the history books is a
patriotic conflict between our "Founding Fathers" and a
foreign enemy. Those who can still quote Jefferson on the
right of revolution are relegated to the "extremist" fringe,
to be rounded up in the next war hysteria or red
scare.
This ideological construct of a unified
"national interest" includes the fiction of a "neutral" set of
laws, which conceals the exploitative nature of the system of
power we live under. Under corporate capitalism the
relationships of exploitation are mediated by the political
system to an extent unknown under previous class systems.
Under chattel slavery and feudalism, exploitation was concrete
and personalized in the producer's relationship with his
master. The slave and peasant knew exactly who was screwing
them. The modern worker, on the other hand, feels a painful
pounding sensation, but has only a vague idea where it is
coming from.
Besides its function of masking the ruling
class interests behind a facade of "general welfare,"
ideological hegemony also manufactures divisions between the
ruled. Through campaigns against "welfare cheats" and
"deadbeats," and demands to "get tough on crime," the ruling
class is able to channel the hostility of the middle and
working classes against the underclass.
Especially nauseating is the phenomenon of
"billionaire populism." Calls for bankruptcy and welfare
"reform," and for wars on crime, are dressed up in
pseudo-populist rhetoric, identifying the underclass as the
chief parasites who feed off the producers' labor. In their
"aw, shucks" symbolic universe, you'd think America was a
Readers Digest/Norman Rockwell world with nothing but
hard-working small businessmen and family farmers, on the one
hand, and welfare cheats, deadbeats, union bosses and
bureaucrats on the other. From listening to them, you'd never
suspect that multibillionaires or global corporations even
exist, let alone that they might stand to benefit from such
"populism."
In the real world, corporations are the
biggest clients of the welfare state, the biggest bankruptcies
are corporate chapter eleven filings, and the worst crimes are
committed in corporate suites rather than on the streets. The
real robbery of the average producer consists of profit and
usury, extorted only with the help of the state--the real "big
government" on our backs. But as long as the working class and
the underclass are busy fighting each other, they won't notice
who is really robbing them.
As Stephen Biko said, "The oppressors most
powerful weapon is the mind of the oppressed."
THE MONEY MONOPOLY. In every system of class exploitation, a ruling class
controls access to the means of production in order to extract tribute from labor.
Under capitalism, access to capital is restricted by the money monopoly, by which
the state or banking system is given a monopoly on the medium of exchange, and
alternative media of exchange are prohibited. The money monopoly also includes
entry barriers against cooperative banks and prohibitions against private issuance
of banknotes, by which access to finance capital is restricted and interest rates
are kept artificially high.
Just in passing, we might mention the
monumental hypocrisy of the regulation of credit unions in the
United States, which require that their membership must share
some common bond, like working for the same employer. Imagine
the outrage if IGA and Safeway lobbied for a national law to
prohibit grocery co-ops unless the members all worked for the
same company! One of the most notable supporters of these laws
is Phil Gramm, that renowned "free marketeer" and economics
professor--and foremost among the banking industry's whores in
Congress.
Individualist and mutualist anarchists like
William Greene [Mutual Banking], Benjamin Tucker
[Instead of a Book], and J. B. Robertson [The
Economics of Liberty] viewed the money monopoly as central
to the capitalist system of privilege. In a genuinely free
banking market, any group of individuals could form a mutual
bank and issue monetized credit in the form of bank notes
against any form of collateral they chose, with acceptance of
these notes as tender being a condition of membership. Greene
speculated that a mutual bank might choose to honor not only
marketable property as collateral, but the "pledging ...
[of] future production." [p. 73]. The result would
be a reduction in interest rates, through competition, to the
cost of administrative overhead--less than one percent.
Abundant cheap credit would drastically alter
the balance of power between capital and labor, and returns on
labor would replace returns on capital as the dominant form of
economic activity. According to Robinson,
Upon the monopoly rate of interest for money that is... forced upon us by law,
is based the whole system of interest upon capital, that permeates all modern business.
With free banking, interest upon bonds of all
kinds and dividends upon stock would fall to the minimum bank
interest charge. The so-called rent of houses... would fall to
the cost of maintenance and replacement.
All that part of the product which is now taken by interest would belong to
the producer. Capital, however... defined, would practically cease to exist as
an income producing fund, for the simple reason that if money, wherewith to buy
capital, could be obtained for one-half of one per cent, capital itself could
command no higher price[pp. 80-81].
And the result would be a drastically improved
bargaining position for tenants and workers against the owners
of land and capital. According to Gary Elkin, Tucker's free
market anarchism carried certain inherent libertarian
socialist implications:
It's important to note that because of
Tucker's proposal to increase the bargaining power of workers
through access to mutual credit, his so-called Individualist
anarchism is not only compatible with workers' control but
would in fact promote it. For if access to mutual credit were
to increase the bargaining power of workers to the extent that
Tucker claimed it would, they would then be able to (1) demand
and get workplace democracy, and (2) pool their credit buy and
own companies collectively.
The banking monopoly was not only the
"lynchpin of capitalism," but also the seed from which the
landlord's monopoly grew. Without a money monopoly, the price
of land would be much lower, and promote "the process of
reducing rents toward zero." [Gary Elkin, "Benjamin
Tucker--Anarchist or Capitalist"].
Given the worker's improved bargaining
position, "capitalists' ability to extract surplus value
from the labor of employees would be eliminated or at least
greatly reduced." [Gary Elkin, Mutual Banking]. As
compensation for labor approached value-added, returns on
capital were driven down by market competition, and the value
of corporate stock consequently plummeted, the worker would
become a de facto co-owner of his workplace, even if the
company remained nominally stockholder-owned.
Near-zero interest rates would increase the
independence of labor in all sorts of interesting ways. For
one thing, anyone with a twenty-year mortgage at 8% now could,
in the absence of usury, pay it off in ten years. Most people
in their 30S would have their houses paid off. Between this
and the nonexistence of high-interest credit card debt, two of
the greatest sources of anxiety to keep one's job at any cost
would disappear. In addition, many workers would have large
savings ("go to hell money"). Significant numbers would
retire in their forties or fifties, cut back to part-time, or
start businesses; with jobs competing for workers, the effect
on bargaining power would be revolutionary.
Our hypothetical world of free credit in many ways resembles the situation in
colonial societies. E. G. Wakefield, in View of the Art of Colonization,
wrote of the unacceptably weak position of the employing class when self-employment
with one's own property was readily available. In colonies, there was a tight labor
market and poor labor discipline because of the abundance of cheap land. "Not only
does the degree of exploitation of the wage-labourer remain indecently low. The
wage-labourer loses into the bargain, along with the relation of dependence, also the
sentiment of dependence on the abstemious capitalist."
Where land is cheap and all men are free, where every one who so pleases can obtain
a piece of land for himself, not only is labour very dear, as respects the labourers'
share of the product, but the difficulty is to obtain combined labour at any price.
>
This environment also prevented the concentration of wealth, as Wakefield commented:
"Few, even of those whose lives are unusually long, can accumulate great masses of
wealth." As a result, colonial elites petitioned the mother country for imported
labor and for restrictions on land for settlement. According to Wakefield's disciple
Herman Merivale, there was an "urgent desire for cheaper and more subservient
labourers--for a class to whom the capitalist might dictate terms, instead of being
dictated to by them." [Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism;
Marx, Chapter 33: "The New Theory of Colonialism," in Capital Vol. 1].
In addition to all this, central banking
systems perform additional service to the interests of
capital. First of all, the chief requirement of finance
capitalists is to avoid inflation, in order to allow
predictable returns on investment. This is ostensibly the
primary purpose of the Federal Reserve and other central
banks. But at least as important is the role of the central
banks in promoting what they consider a "natural" level of
unemployment--until the 1990s around six per cent. The reason
is that when unemployment goes much below this figure, labor
becomes increasingly uppity and presses for better pay and
working conditions and more autonomy. Workers are willing to
take a lot less crap off the boss when they know they can find
a job at least as good the next day. On the other hand,
nothing is so effective in "getting your mind right" as the
knowledge that people are lined up to take your job.
The Clinton "prosperity" is a seeming exception to this principle. As unemployment
threatened to drop below the four per cent mark, some members of the Federal Reserve
agitated to raise interest rates and take off the "inflationary" pressure by throwing
a few million workers on the street. But as Greenspan [Testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan] testified before the Senate Banking Committee, the situation was unique.
Given the degree of job insecurity in the high-tech economy, there was "[a]typical
restraint on compensation increases." In 1996, even with a tight labor market, 46% of
workers at large firms were fearful of layoffs--compared to only 25% in 1991, when
unemployment was much higher.
The reluctance of workers to leave their jobs to seek other employment as the labor
market tightened has provided further evidence of such concern, as has the tendency
toward longer labor union contracts. For many decades, contracts rarely exceeded three
years. Today, one can point to five and six-year contracts--contracts that are commonly
characterized by an emphasis on job security and that involve only modest wage increases.
The low level of work stoppages of recent years also attests to concern about job security.
Thus the willingness of workers in recent years to trade off smaller increases in wages
for greater job security seems to be reasonably well documented. For the bosses, the high-tech
economy is the next best thing to high unemployment for keeping our minds right. "Fighting inflation"
translates operationally to increasing job insecurity and making workers less likely to strike
or to look for new jobs.
PATENTS. The patent privilege has been used on a massive scale to promote concentration
of capital, erect entry barriers, and maintain a monopoly of advanced technology in the hands of
western corporations. It is hard even to imagine how much more decentralized the economy would
be without it. Right-libertarian Murray Rothbard considered patents a fundamental violation
of free market principles.
The man who has not bought a machine and who arrives at the same invention independently,
will, on the free market, be perfectly able to use and sell his invention. Patents prevent
a man from using his invention even though all the property is his and he has not stolen
the invention, either explicitly or implicitly, from the first inventor. Patents, therefore,
are grants of exclusive monopoly privilege by the State and are invasions of property rights
on the market. [Man, Economy, and State vol. 2 p. 655]
Patents make an astronomical price difference. Until the early 1970s, for example, Italy
did not recognize drug patents. As a result, Roche Products charged the British national health
a price over 40 times greater for patented components of Librium and Valium than charged by
competitors in Italy [Raghavan, Recolonization p. 124].
Patents suppress innovation as much as they encourage it. Chakravarthi Raghavan pointed
out that research scientists who actually do the work of inventing are required to sign over
patent rights as a condition of employment, while patents and industrial security programs
prevent sharing of information, and suppress competition in further improvement of patented
inventions. [op. cit. p. 118] Rothbard likewise argued that patents eliminate "the competitive
spur for further research" because incremental innovation based on others' patents is
prohibited, and because the holder can "rest on his laurels for the entire period of the
patent," with no fear of a competitor improving his invention. And they hamper technical
progress because "mechanical inventions are discoveries of natural law rather than individual
creations, and hence similar independent inventions occur all the time. The simultaneity
of inventions is a familiar historical fact." [op. cit. pp. 655, 658-659].
The intellectual property regime under the
Uruguay Round of GATT goes far beyond traditional patent law
in suppressing innovation. One benefit of traditional patent
law, at least, was that it required an invention under patent
to be published. Under U.S. pressure, however, "trade secrets"
were included in GATT. As a result, governments will be
required to help suppress information not formally protected
by patents [Raghavan, op. cit. p. 122].
And patents are not necessary as an incentive
to innovate. According to Rothbard, invention is rewarded by
the competitive advantage accruing to the first developer of
an idea. This is borne out by F. M. Scherer's testimony before
the FTC in 1995 [Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based
Competition]. Scherer spoke of a survey of 91 companies
in which only seven "accorded high significance to patent
protection as a factor in their R & D investments."
Most of them described patents as "the least important
of considerations." Most companies considered their chief
motivation in R & D decisions to be "the necessity of
remaining competitive, the desire for efficient production,
and the desire to expand and diversify their sales." In
another study, Scherer found no negative effect on R & D
spending as a result of compulsory licensing of patents. A
survey of U.S. firms found that 86% of inventions would have
been developed without patents. In the case of automobiles,
office equipment, rubber products, and textiles, the figure
was 100%.
The one exception was drugs, in which 60%
supposedly would not have been invented. I suspect
disingenuousness on the part of the respondents, however. For
one thing, drug companies get an unusually high portion of
their R & D funding from the government, and many of their
most lucrative products were developed entirely at government
expense. And Scherer himself cited evidence to the contrary.
The reputation advantage for being the first into a market is
considerable. For example in the late 1970s, the structure of
the industry and pricing behavior was found to be very similar
between drugs with and those without patents. Being the first
mover with a non-patented drug allowed a company to maintain a
30% market share and to charge premium prices.
The injustice of patent monopolies is
exacerbated by government funding of research and innovation,
with private industry reaping monopoly profits from technology
it didn't spend a penny to develop. In 1999, extending the
research and experimentation tax credit was, along with
extensions of a number of other corporate tax preferences,
considered the most urgent business of the Congressional
leadership. Hastert, when asked if any elements of the tax
bill were essential, said: "I think the [tax preference]
extenders are something we're going to have to work on."
Ways and Means Chair Bill Archer added, "before the year is
out... we will do the extenders in a very stripped down bill
that doesn't include anything else." A five-year extension
of the research and experimentation credit (retroactive to 1
July 1999) was expected to cost $13.1 billion. (That credit
makes the effective tax rate on R & D spending less than
zero.) [Citizens for Tax Justice, GOP Leaders Distill
Essence of Tax Plan].
The Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, with
1984 and 1986 amendments, allowed private industry to keep
patents on products developed with government R & D
money--and then to charge ten, twenty, or forty times the cost
of production. For example, AZT was developed with government
money and in the public domain since 1964. The patent was
given away to Burroughs Wellcome Corp. [Chris Lewis,
"Public Assets, Private Profits"].
As if the deck were not sufficiently stacked
already, the pharmaceutical companies in 1999 actually lobbied
Congress to extend certain patents by two years by a special
act of private law [Benjamin Grove, "Gibbons backs
drug-monopoly bill"].
Patents have been used throughout the
twentieth century "to circumvent antitrust laws,"
according to David Noble. They were "bought up in large
numbers to suppress competition," which also resulted in
"the suppression of invention itself." [America by
Design, pp. 84-109]. Edwin Prindle, a corporate patent lawyer,
wrote in 1906:
Patents are the best and most effective means
of controlling competition. They occasionally give absolute
command of the market, enabling their owner to name the price
without regard to the cost of production.... Patents are the
only legal form of absolute monopoly [America by Design p. 90].
Patents played a key role in the formation of
the electrical appliance, communications, and chemical
industries. G. E. and Westinghouse expanded to dominate the
electrical manufacturing market at the turn of the century
largely through patent control. In 1906 they curtailed the
patent litigation between them by pooling their patents.
AT&T also expanded "primarily through strategies of
patent monopoly." The American chemical industry was
marginal until 1917, when Attorney-General Mitchell Palmer
seized German patents and distributed them among the major
American chemical companies. DuPont got licenses on 300 of the
735 patents [America by Design pp. 10, 16].
Patents are also being used on a global scale
to lock the transnational corporations into a permanent
monopoly of productive technology. The single most
totalitarian provision of the Uruguay Round is probably its
"intellectual property" provisions. GATT has extended both the
scope and duration of patents far beyond anything ever
envisioned in original patent law. In England, patents were
originally for fourteen years--the time needed to train two
journeymen in succession (and by analogy, the time necessary
to go into production and reap the initial profit for
originality). By that standard, given the shorter training
times required today, and the shorter lifespan of technology,
the period of monopoly should be shorter. Instead, the U.S.
seeks to extend them to fifty years [Raghavan,
Recolonization pp. 119-120]. According to Martin Khor
Kok Peng, the U.S. is by far the most absolutist of the
participants in the Uruguay Round. Unlike the European
Community, and for biological processes for animal and plant
protection [The Uruguay Round and Third World Sovereignty
p. 28].
The provisions for biotech are really a way of
increasing trade barriers, and forcing consumers to subsidize
the TNCs engaged in agribusiness. The U.S. seeks to apply
patents to genetically-modified organisms, effectively
pirating the work of generations of Third World breeders by
isolating beneficial genes in traditional varieties and
incorporating them in new GMOs--and maybe even enforcing
patent rights against the traditional variety which was the
source of the genetic material. For example Monsanto has
attempted to use the presence of their DNA in a crop as prima
facie evidence of pirating--when it is much more likely that
their variety cross-pollinated and contaminated the farmer's
crop against his will. The Pinkerton agency, by the way, plays
a leading role in investigating such charges--that's right,
the same folks who have been breaking strikes and kicking
organizers down stairs for the past century. Even jack-booted
thugs have to diversify to make it in the global economy.
The developed world has pushed particularly
hard to protect industries relying on or producing "generic
technologies," and to restrict diffusion of "dual use"
technologies. The U. S.-Japanese trade agreement on
semi-conductors, for example, is a "cartel-like, 'managed
trade' agreement." So much for "free trade." [Dieter
Ernst, "Technology, Economic Security and Latecomer
Industrialization," in Raghavan Pp. 39-40].
Patent law traditionally required a holder to
work the invention in a country in order to receive patent
protection. U.K. law allowed compulsory licensing after three
years if an invention was not being worked, or being worked
fully, and demand was being met "to a substantial extent" by
importation; or where the export market was not being
supplied because of the patentee's refusal to grant licenses
on reasonable terms [Raghavan pp. 120, 138].
The central motivation in the GATT intellectual property regime, however, is to
permanently lock in the collective monopoly of advanced technology by TNCs, and prevent
independent competition from ever arising in the Third World. It would, as Martin Khor
Kok Peng writes, "effectively prevent the diffusion of technology to the Third World,
and would tremendously increase monopoly royalties of the TNCs whilst curbing the potential
development of Third World technology." Only one percent of patents worldwide are owned
in the Third World. Of patents granted in the 1970s by Third World countries, 84% were
foreign-owned. But fewer than 5% of foreign-owned patents were actually used in production.
As we saw before, the purpose of owning a patent is not necessarily to use it, but to prevent
anyone else from using it [op. cit. pp. 29-30].
Raghavan summed up nicely the effect on the Third World:
Given the vast outlays in R and D and investments, as well as the short life
cycle of some of these products, the leading Industrial Nations are trying to
prevent emergence of competition by controlling... the flows of technology to
others. The Uruguay round is being sought to be used to create export monopolies
for the products of Industrial Nations, and block or slow down the rise of
competitive rivals, particularly in the newly industrializing Third World countries.
At the same time the technologies of senescent industries of the north are sought
to be exported to the South under conditions of assured renter income [op. cit. p. 96].
Corporate propagandists piously denounce anti-globalists as enemies of the Third World,
seeking to use trade barriers to maintain an affluent Western lifestyle at the expense of
the poor nations. The above measures--trade barriers--to permanently suppress Third World
technology and keep the South as a big sweatshop, give the lie to this "humanitarian"
concern. This is not a case of differing opinions, or of sincerely mistaken understanding
of the facts. Setting aside false subtleties, what we see here is pure evil at work--Orwell's
"boot stamping on a human face forever." If any architects of this policy believe it to be
for general human well-being, it only shows the capacity of ideology to justify the oppressor
to himself and enable him to sleep at night.
INFRASTRUCTURE. Spending on
transportation and communications networks from general
revenues, rather than from taxes and user fees, allows big
business to "externalize its costs" on the public, and conceal
its true operating expenses. Chomsky described this state
capitalist underwriting of shipping costs quite
accurately:
One well-known fact about trade is that it's highly subsidized with huge market-distorting
factors.... The most obvious is that every form of transport is highly subsidized.... Since
trade naturally requires transport, the costs of transport enter into the calculation of the
efficiency of trade. But there are huge subsidies to reduce the costs of transport, through
manipulation of energy costs and all sorts of market distorting functions
["How Free is the Free Market?"].
Every wave of concentration of capital has
followed a publicly subsidized infrastructure system of some
sort. The national railroad system, built largely on free or
below-cost land donated by the government, was followed by
concentration in heavy industry, petrochemicals, and finance.
The next major infrastructure projects were the national
highway system, starting with the system of designated
national highways in the 1920s and culminating with
Eisenhower's interstate system; and the civil aviation system,
built almost entirely with federal money. The result was
massive concentration in retail, agriculture, and food
processing.
The third such project was the infrastructure
of the worldwide web, originally built by the Pentagon. It
permits, for the first time, direction of global operations in
real time from a single corporate headquarters, and is
accelerating the concentration of capital on a global scale.
To quote Chomsky again, "The telecommunications
revolution... is... another state component of the
international economy that didn't develop through private
capital, but through the public paying to destroy
themselves...." [Class Warfare p. 40].
The centralized corporate economy depends for
its existence on a shipping price system which is artificially
distorted by government intervention. To fully grasp how
dependent the corporate economy is on socializing
transportation and communications costs, imagine what would
happen if truck and aircraft fuel were taxed enough to pay the
full cost of maintenance and new building costs on highways
and airports; and if fossil fuels depletion allowances were
removed. The result would be a massive increase in shipping
costs. Does anyone seriously believe that Wal-Mart could
continue to undersell local retailers, or corporate
agribusiness could destroy the family farm?
Intellectually honest right libertarians freely admit as much. For example,
Tiber Machan wrote in The Freeman that
Some people will say that stringent protection of rights [against
eminent domain] would lead to small airports, at best, and many constraints
on construction. Of course--but what's so wrong with that?
Perhaps the worst thing about modern industrial life has been the power of
political authorities to grant special privileges to some enterprises to violate
the rights of third parties whose permission would be too expensive to obtain.
The need to obtain that permission would indeed seriously impede what most
environmentalists see as rampant--indeed reckless--industrialization.
The system of private property rights--in which... all... kinds of... human
activity must be conducted within one's own realm except where cooperation from others
has been gained voluntarily--is the greatest moderator of human aspirations.... In
short, people may reach goals they aren't able to reach with their own resources only
by convincing others, through arguments and fair exchanges, to cooperate
["On Airports and Individual Rights"].
The logjams and bottlenecks in the transportation system are an inevitable result
of subsidies. Those who debate the reason for planes stacked up at O'Hare airport,
or decry the fact that highways and bridges are deteriorating several times faster
than repairs are being budgeted, need only read an economics 101 text. Market prices
are signals that relate supply to demand. When subsidies distort these signals, the
consumer does not perceive the real cost of producing the goods he consumes. The
"feedback loop" is broken, and demands on the system overwhelm it beyond its ability
to respond. When people don't have to pay the real cost of something they consume,
they aren't very careful about only using what they need. It is interesting that
every major antitrust action in this century has involved either some basic energy
resource, or some form of infrastructure, on which the overall economy depends.
Standard Oil, AT&T, and Microsoft were all cases in which monopoly price gouging
was a danger to the economy as a whole. This brings to mind Engels' observation that
advanced capitalism would reach a stage where the state--"the official representative
of capitalist society"--would have to convert "the great institutions for
intercourse and communication" into state property. Engels did not foresee the
use of antitrust actions to achieve the same end [Anti-Duhring].
"MILITARY KEYNESIANISM". The leading sectors of the economy, including
cybernetics, communications, and military industry, have their
sales and profits virtually guaranteed by the state. The
entire manufacturing sector, as a whole, was permanently
expanded beyond recognition by an infusion of federal money
during World War II. In 1939 the entire manufacturing plant of
the U.S. was valued at $40 billion. By 1945, another $26
billion worth of plant and equipment had been built, "two
thirds of it paid for directly from government funds." The
top 250 corporations in 1939 owned 65% of plant and equipment,
but during the war operated 79% of all new facilities built
with government funds [Mills, The Power Elite p. 101].
Machine tools were vastly expanded by the war. In 1940, 23% of machine tools in
use were less than 10 years old. By 1945, the figure had grown to 62%. The industry
contracted rapidly after 1945, and would probably have gone into a depression, had it
not returned to wartime levels of output during Korea and remained that way throughout
the Cold War. The R & D complex, likewise, was a creation of the war. Between 1939
and 1945, the share of AT&T research expenditures made up of government contracts
expanded from 1% to 83%. Over 90% of the patents resulting from government-funded wartime
research were given away to industry. The modern electronics industry was largely a
product of World War II and Cold War spending (e.g., miniaturization of circuits for
bomb proximity fuses, high capacity computers for command and control, etc.) [Noble,
Forces of Production pp. 8-16].
The jumbo jet industry would never have come
about without continuous Cold War levels of military spending.
The machine tools needed for producing large aircraft were so
complex and expensive that no "small peacetime orders" would
have provided a sufficient production run to pay for them.
Without large military orders, they would simply not have
existed. The aircraft industry quickly spiraled into red ink
after 1945, and was near bankruptcy at the beginning of the
1948 war scare, after which Truman restored it to life with
massive spending. By 1964, 90% of aerospace R & D was
funded by the government, with massive spillover into the
electronics, machine tool, and other industries [Noble,
Forces of Production pp. 6-7; Kofsky, Harry S.
Truman and the War Scare of 1948].
OTHER SUBSIDIES. Infrastructure and
military spending are not the only examples of the process by
which cost and risk are socialized, and profit is
privatized--or, as Rothbard put it, by which "our corporate
state uses the coercive taxing power either to accumulate
corporate capital or to lower corporate costs."
["Confessions of a Right-Wing Liberal"]. Some of these
government assumptions of risk and cost are ad hoc and
targeted toward specific industries.
Among the greatest beneficiaries of such
underwriting are electrical utilities. Close to 100% of all
research and development for nuclear power is either performed
by the government itself, in its military reactor program, or
by lump-sum R & D grants; the government waives
use-charges for nuclear fuels, subsidizes uranium production,
provides access to government land below market price (and
builds hundreds of miles of access roads at taxpayer expense),
enriches uranium, and disposes of waste at sweetheart prices.
The Price-Anderson Act of 1957 limited the liability of the
nuclear power industry, and assumed government liability above
that level [Adams and Brock pp. 279-281]. A Westinghouse
official admitted in 1953,
If you were to inquire whether Westinghouse might consider putting up its own
money.., we would have to say "No." The cost of the plant would be a question mark
until after we built it and, by that sole means, found out the answer. We would not
be sure of successful plant operation until after we had done all the work and operated
successfully.... This is still a situation of pyramiding uncertainties.... There is a
distinction between risk-taking and recklessness [Ibid. pp. 278-279].
So much for profit as a reward for the entrepreneur's risk. These "entrepreneurs"
make their profits in the same way as a seventeenth-century courtier, by obtaining
the favor of the king. To quote Chomsky,
the sectors of the economy that remain competitive are those that feed from the
public trough.... The glories of Free Enterprise provide a useful weapon against
government policies that might benefit the general population.... But the rich
and powerful... have long appreciated the need to protect themselves from the
destructive forces of free-market capitalism, which may provide suitable themes
for rousing oratory, but only so long as the public handout and the regulatory
and protectionist apparatus are secure, and state power is on call when needed
(Chomsky, Deterring Democracy p. 144].
Dwayne Andreas, the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland, admitted that "[t]here
is not one grain of anything in the world that is sold in the free market. Not
one. The only place you see a free market is in the speeches of politicians.
" [Don Carney, "Dwayne's World"].
Big business also enjoys financial support
through the tax code. It is likely that most of the Fortune
500 would go bankrupt without corporate welfare. Direct
federal tax breaks to business in 1996 were close to $350
billion [Based on my crunching on numbers in Zepezauer and
Naiman, Take the Rich Off Welfare]. This figure, for
federal corporate welfare alone, is over two-thirds of annual
corporate profits for 1996 ($460 billion) [Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1996].
Estimates of state and local tax breaks is
fairly impressionistic, since they vary not only with each
critic's subjective definition of "corporate welfare," but
involve the tax codes of fifty states and the public records
of thousands of municipalities. Besides money pimps in the
state and local governments are embarassed by the sweet deals
they give their corporate johns. In my own state of Arkansas,
the incorruptible Baptist preacher who serves as governor
opposed a bill to require quarterly public reports from the
Department of Economic Development on its special tax breaks
to businesses. "[K]eeping incentive records from public
scrutiny is important in attracting business," and
releasing "proprietary information" could have a
"chilling effect." [Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 3
Feb. 2001]. But state and local corporate welfare could easily
amount to a figure comparable to federal.
Taken as a whole, direct tax breaks to
business at all levels of government are probably on the same
order of magnitude as corporate profits. And this understates
the effect of corporate welfare, since it disproportionately
goes to a handful of giant firms in each industry. For
example, accelerated depreciation favors expansion by existing
firms. New firms find it of little benefit, since they are
likely to lose money their first few years. An established
firm, however, can run a loss in a new venture and charge the
accelerated depreciation against its profits on old facilities
[Baratz, "Corporate Giants and the Power Structure"].
The most outrageous of these tax expenditures
is the subsidy to the actual financial transactions by which
capital is concentrated. The interest deduction on corporate
debt, most of which was run up on leveraged buyouts and
acquisitions, costs the treasury over $200 billion a year
[Zepezauer p. 122-123]. Without this deduction, the wave of
mergers in the 1980s, or the megamergers of the 1990s, could
never have taken place. On top of everything else, this acts
as a massive direct subsidy to banking, increasing the power
of finance capital in the corporate economy to a level greater
than it has been since the Age of Morgan.
A closely related subsidy is the exemption
from capital gains of securities transactions involved in
corporate mergers (i.e. "stock swaps")--even though premiums
are usually paid well over the market value of the stock
[Green p. 11]. The 1986 tax reform included a provision which
prevented corporations from deducting fees for investment
'banks and advisers involved in leveraged buyouts. The 1996
minimum wage increase repealed this provision, with one
exception: interest deductions were removed for employee
buyouts [Judis, "Bare Minimum"].
Right libertarians like Rothbard object to
classifying tax expenditures as subsidies. It presumes that
tax money rightfully belongs to the government, when in fact
the government is only letting them keep what is rightfully
theirs. The tax code is indeed unfair, but the solution is to
eliminate the taxes for everyone, not to level the code up
[Rothbard, Power and Market p. 104]. This is a very
shaky argument. Supporters of tax code reform in the 1980s
insisted that the sole legitimate purpose of taxation was to
raise revenue, not to provide carrots and sticks for social
engineering purposes. And, semantic quibbling aside, the
current tax system would be exactly the same if we started out
with zero tax rates and then imposed a punitive tax only on
those not engaged in favored activities. Either way, the
uneven tax policy gives a competitive advantage to privileged
industries.
POLITICAL REPRESSION. In times of
unusual popular consciousness and mobilization, when the
capitalist system faces grave political threats, the state
resorts to repression until the danger is past. The major such
waves in this country--the Haymarket reaction, and the red
scares after the world wars--are recounted by Goldstein
[Political Repression in Modern America]. But the wave
of repression which began in the 1970s, though less intense,
has been permanently institutionalized to a unique extent.
Until the late 1960s, elite perspective was
governed by the New Deal social contract. The corporate state
would buy stability and popular acquiescence in imperialist
exploitation abroad by guaranteeing a level of prosperity and
security to the middle class. In return for higher wages,
unions would enforce management control of the workplace. But
starting during the Vietnam era, the elite's thinking
underwent a profound change.
They concluded from the 1960s experience that
the social contract had failed. In response to the antiwar
protests and race riots, LBJ and Nixon began to create an
institutional framework for martial law, to make sure that any
such disorder in the future could be dealt with differently.
Johnson's operation GARDEN PLOT involved domestic surveillance
by the military, contingency plans for military cooperation
with local police in suppressing disorder in all fifty states,
plans for mass preventive detention, and joint exercises of
police and the regular military [Morales, U.S. Military
Civil Disturbance Planning]. Governor Reagan and his
National Guard chief Louis Giuffrida were enthusiastic
supporters of GARDEN PLOT exercises in California. Reagan was
also a pioneer in creating quasi-military SWAT teams, which
now exist in every major town.
The wave of wildcat strikes in the early 1970s
showed that organized labor could no longer keep its part of
the bargain, and that the social contract should be reasessed.
At the same time, the business press was flooded with articles
on the impending "capital shortage," and calls for shifting
resources from consumption to capital accumulation. They
predicted frankly that a cap on real wages would be hard to
force on the public in the existing political environment
[Boyte, Backyard Revolution pp. 13-16]. This sentiment
was expressed by Huntington et al. in The Crisis of
Democracy (a paper for the Trilateral Institution--a good
proxy for elite thinking); they argued that the system was
collapsing from demand overload, because of an excess of
democracy.
Corporations embraced the full range of
union-busting possibilities in Taft-Hartley, risking only token
fines from the NLRB. They drastically increased management
resources devoted to workplace surveillance and control, a
necessity because of discontent from stagnant wages and
mounting workloads [Fat and Mean]. Wages as a
percentage of value added have declined drastically since
the 1970s; all increases in labor productivity have been
channeled into profit and investment, rather than wages. A
new Cold War military buildup further transferred public
resources to industry.
A series of events like the fall of Saigon,
the nonaligned movement, and the New International Economic
Order were taken as signs that the transnational corporate
empire was losing control. Reagan's escalating intervention in
Central America was a partial response to this perception. But
more importantly the Uruguay Round of GATT snatched total
victory from the jaws of defeat; it ended all barriers to TNCs
buying up entire economies, locked the west into monopoly
control of modern technology, and created a world government
on behalf of global corporations.
In the meantime the U.S. was, in the words of
Richard K. Moore, importing techniques of social control from
the imperial periphery to the core area. With the help of the
Drug War and the National Security State, the apparatus of
repression continued to grow. The Drug War has turned the
Fourth Amendment into toilet paper; civil forfeiture, with the
aid of jailhouse snitches, gives police the power to steal
property without ever filing charges--a lucrative source of
funds for helicopters and Kevlar vests. SWAT teams have led to
the militarization of local police forces, and cross-training
with the military has led many urban police departments to
view the local population as an occupied enemy [Weber,
Warrior Cops].
Reagan's crony Giuffrida resurfaced as head of
FEMA, where he worked with Oliver North to fine-tune GARDEN
PLOT. North, as the NSC liaison with FEMA from 1982-84,
developed a plan "to suspend the constitution in the event
of a national crisis, such as nuclear war, violent and
widespread internal dissent or national opposition to a U.S.
military invasion abroad." [Chardy, "Reagan Aides and
the 'Secret' Government"]. GARDEN PLOT, interestingly, was
implemented during the Rodney King Riots and in recent
anti-globalization protests. Delta Force provided intelligence
and advice in those places and at Waco [Rosenberg, The
Empire Strikes Back; Cockburn, The Jackboot
State].
Another innovation is to turn everyone we
deal with into a police agent. Banks routinely report
"suspicious" movements of cash; under "know your customer"
programs, retailers report purchases of items which can
conceivably be used in combination to manufacture drugs;
libraries come under pressure to report on readers of
"subversive" material; DARE programs turn kids into police
informers.
Computer technology has increased the
potential for surveillance to Orwellian levels. Pentium III
processors were revealed to embed identity codes in every
document written on them. Police forces are experimenting with
combinations of public cameras, digital face-recognition
technology, and databases of digital photos. Image Data LLC, a
company in the process of buying digital drivers license
photos from all fifty states, was exposed as a front for the
Secret Service.
CONCLUSION. It is almost too easy to bring back Bob Novak and Secretary
O'Neill for another kick--but I can't resist. "Marxist class warfare?" "Robber
baron rhetoric?" Well, the pages above recount the "class warfare" waged by the
robber barons themselves. If their kind tend to squeal like pigs when we talk about
class, it's because they've been stuck. But all the squealing in the world won't
change the facts.
But what are the implications of the above
facts for our movement? It is commonly acknowledged that the
manorial economy was founded on force. Although you will never
see the issue addressed by Milton Friedman, intellectually
honest right libertarians like Rothbard acknowledge the role
of the state in creating European feudalism and American
slavery. Rothbard, drawing the obvious conclusion from this
fact, acknowledged the right of peasants or freed slaves to
take over their "forty acres and a mule" without compensation
to the landlord.
But we have seen that industrial capitalism,
to the same extent as manorialism or slavery, was founded on
force. Like its predecessors, capitalism could not have
survived at any point in its history without state
intervention. Coercive state measures at every step have
denied workers access to capital, forced them to sell their
labor in a buyer's market, and protected the centers of
economic power from the dangers of the free market. To quote
Benjamin Tucker again, landlords and capitalists cannot
extract surplus value from labor without the help of the
state. The modern worker, like the slave or the serf, is the
victim of ongoing robbery; he works in an enterprise built
from past stolen labor. By the same principles that Rothbard
recognized in the agrarian realm, the modern worker is
justified in taking direct control of production, and keeping
the entire product of his labor.
In a very real sense, every subsidy and
privilege described above is a form of slavery. Slavery,
simply put, is the use of coercion to live off of someone
else's labor. For example, consider the worker who pays $300 a
month for a drug under patent, that would cost $30 in a free
market. If he is paid $15 an hour, the eighteen hours he works
every month to pay the difference are slavery. Every hour
worked to pay usury on a credit card or mortgage is slavery.
The hours worked to pay unnecessary distribution and marketing
costs (comprising half of retail prices), because of subsidies
to economic centralization, is slavery. Every additional hour
someone works to meet his basic needs, because the state tilts
the field in favor of the bosses and forces him to sell his
labor for less than it is worth, is slavery.
All these forms of slavery together probably
amount to half our working hours. If we kept the full value of
our labor, we could probably maintain current levels of
consumption with a work week of twenty hours. As Bill Haywood
said, for every man who gets a dollar he didn't sweat for,
someone else sweated to produce a dollar he never received.
Our survey also casts doubt on the position of
"anarchist" social democrat Noam Chomsky, who is notorious for
his distinction between "visions" and "goals." His long-term
vision is a decentralized society of self-governing
communities and workplaces, loosely federated together--the
traditional anarchist vision. His immediate goal, however, is
to strengthen the regulatory state in order to break up
"private concentrations of power," before anarchism can be
achieved. But if , as we have seen, capitalism is dependent on
the state to guarantee it survival, it follows that it is
sufficient to eliminate the statist props to capitalism. In a
letter of 4 September 1867, Engels aptly summed up the
difference between anarchists and state socialists: "They
say 'abolish the state and capital will go to the devil.' We
propose the reverse." Exactly.
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RED LION PRESS, 2001
Revised January 2002
Order the book here:
The Iron Fist Behind the Invisible Hand: Corporate Capitalism as a System of State-Guaranteed Privilege