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Federalist No. 85
Concluding Remarks
From McLEAN'S Edition, New York.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain
for discussion two points: ``the analogy of the proposed government
to your own State constitution,'' and ``the additional security
which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty,
and to property.'' But these heads have been so fully anticipated
and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now
scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more
dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced
stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire
to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the
convention to the act which organizes the government of this
State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects,
than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended
defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of
a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission
of a provision respecting the liberty of the press. These and
several others which have been noted in the course of our inquiries
are as much chargeable on the existing constitution of this State,
as on the one proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender
pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections
which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed
can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation
of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention
among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the government
under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked
that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution
is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty
and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan
under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which
the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in
single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from
leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in
the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which
the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate;
in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which
could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited
situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government
to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of
nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those
practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined
the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust
in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned
an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned
to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I
trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance
I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should
be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments,
and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt
to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have
been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the
opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against
the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately
brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it
too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of
every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny.
The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy,
the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the
disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments
and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced
to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature
to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible
that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into
intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain
that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and
moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed,
it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course
of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily
vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it
has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and
necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound
to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of
his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the
genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from
which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'This is one that
he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that
form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly.
No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion,
no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to
his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the
part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to
party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide
is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence
of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of America
has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve
or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in
the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption,
and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which
it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which
our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and
superior to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it
has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter
of no small triumph to its enemies. ``Why,'' say they, ``should
we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect
before it is irrevocably established?'' This may be plausible
enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark,
that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated.
They have been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan
is radically defective, and that without material alterations
the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely
confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning
of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of
their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will
not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may
not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one;
is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country
will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of
security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme
of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national
affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive
experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never
expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of
the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be
a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good
sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed.
The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in
a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise
of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection
spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately
published in this city, [1] are
unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a
new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable
to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met,
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there
used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive
circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every
friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light
in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered,
and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I
cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it
in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that
it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments
to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the
present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one,
and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete
establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require
the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the
Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States
as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by
nine [2] States. Here, then,
the chances are as thirteen to nine in favor of subsequent amendment,
rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States
must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in
which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their
interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to
see, in any body of men charged with its original formation,
very different combinations of the parts upon different points.
Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become
the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either
may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of
moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose
the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to
the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties
and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final
act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a
ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established,
would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly.
There would then be no necessity for management or compromise,
in relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will
of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive
issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States,
were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment
must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison
between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing
in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments,
it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration
of the national government will always be disinclined to yield
up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed.
For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any
amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful,
will be applicable to the organization of the government, not
to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think
there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think
there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic
difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate, independent
of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further
consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt,
that the observation is futile. It is this that the national
rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon
the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will
be obliged ``on the application of the legislatures of two thirds
of the States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convention
for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents
and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions
in three fourths thereof.'' The words of this article are peremptory.
The Congress ``shall call a convention.'' Nothing in this particular
is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all
the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes
in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two
thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments
which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend
any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative
to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely
rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers
against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that
I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one
of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought
to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the
matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be
for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption,
as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment
of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to
accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer
equally solid and ingenious: ``To balance a large state or society
Usays hee, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws,
is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however
comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection,
to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience
must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and
the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which
they INEVITABLY fall into in their first trials and experiments.''
[3] These judicious reflections
contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the
Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding
anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from
each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
demagoguery, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain,
but from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political
fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal
tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a
longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,
without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace,
by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to
the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety.
I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold
we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the
thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable
a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more
the consequences of new attempts, because I know that powerful
individuals, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general
national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS. 1. Entitled ``An Address to the People of the State of
New York.''
2. It may rather be said
TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three
fourths must ratify.
3. Hume's ``Essays,''
vol. i., page 128: ``The Rise of Arts and Sciences.''
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