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Federalist No. 34
The Same Subject Continued:
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet.
Friday, January 4, 1788.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number
that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution,
would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of
revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open
to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community,
there can be no color for the assertion that they would not possess
means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of their
own wants, independent of all external control. That the field
is sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to advert
to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which
it will fall to the lot of the State governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority
cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact
and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show
that a thing OUGHT NOT TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected
when they are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary
to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in
the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort,
resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches
of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures,
in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician;
in the other, the plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced
to prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities,
each having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But
a man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted
at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood
that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA.
The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged
as to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in the latter,
in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire
predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages,
and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human
greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no
such contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is
no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in
practice there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience;
because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will
naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and
in the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find
it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the
particular States would be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this
question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between
the objects that will require a federal provision in respect
to revenue, and those which will require a State provision. We
shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and
that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds.
In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not
to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward
to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not
to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon
a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages,
according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing,
therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of
any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from
an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a
CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may happen;
and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible
safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation
might be made with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose
of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting
engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments
which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace.
But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of
folly, to stop at this point, and to leave the government intrusted
with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute
incapacity to provide for the protection of the community against
future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or domestic
convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point,
where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing
for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert,
in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment
of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may safely
challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their
data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain
as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration
of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of
internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will
admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a
commercial people, it must form a part of our policy to be able
one day to defend that commerce. The support of a navy and of
naval wars would involve contingencies that must baffle all the
efforts of political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment
in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive
war founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not
to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition
or enmity of other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging
over the European world. If it should break forth into a storm,
who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would
not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce
that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible
materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated
without coming to maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without
extending to us, what security can we have that our tranquillity
will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some
other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always
be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we
may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish
the ambition of others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion
of the last war that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted
as they both were, would so soon have looked with so hostile
an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind,
we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive
passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful
sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that
to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity,
is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government?
What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with
which several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers
plainly is, wars and rebellions; the support of those institutions
which are necessary to guard the body politic against these two
most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from those
institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of
a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial
departments, with their different appendages, and to the encouragement
of agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost
all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison
with those which relate to the national defense.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious
apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth
part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the
class of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths
are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted
for carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged,
and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand,
it should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution
of the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy
are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might
be necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be
remarked that there should be as great a disproportion between
the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic
administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular
become the modest simplicity of republican government. If we
balance a proper deduction from one side against that which it
is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may
still be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves
contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common
share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we
shall instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration,
that there must always be an immense disproportion between the
objects of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several
of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts,
which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen
again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts
are discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence,
which the State governments will continue to experience, will
be for the mere support of their respective civil list; to which,
if we add all contingencies, the total amount in every State
ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves,
we ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent,
to calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense.
If this principle be a just one our attention would be directed
to a provision in favor of the State governments for an annual
sum of about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies
of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination.
In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained
that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an
EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of
two hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in
EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union, would be to take the
resources of the community out of those hands which stood in
need of them for the public welfare, in order to put them into
other hands which could have no just or proper occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed
upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue,
between the Union and its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative
necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for
the use of the States, that would not either have been too much
or too little too little for their present, too much for their
future wants? As to the line of separation between external and
internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation,
the command of two thirds of the resources of the community to
defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and
to the Union, one third of the resources of the community, to
defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses.
If we desert this boundary and content ourselves with leaving
to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands,
there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS
and the END; the possession of one third of the resources of
the community to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If
any fund could have been selected and appropriated, equal to
and not greater than the object, it would have been inadequate
to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States,
and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision
for this purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the position
which has been elsewhere laid down, that ``A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute
for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power,
of State authority to that of the Union.'' Any separation of
the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would
have amounted to a sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union
to the POWER of the individual States. The convention thought
the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination;
and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling
an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal
government with an adequate and independent power in the States
to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other
lights, in which this important subject of taxation will claim
a further consideration.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 35 -->
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