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Federalist No. 33
The Same Subject Continued:
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the Daily Advertiser.
Thursday, January 3, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the
Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following
clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article
of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature
``to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying
into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the
government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof''; and the second clause of the sixth article declares,
``that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made
IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority
shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.''
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective
and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They
have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors
of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their
local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated;
as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither
sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet,
strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who
may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light,
it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional
operation of the intended government would be precisely the same,
if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated
in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which
would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication
from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting
it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition,
that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which
have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan,
without emotions that disturb its equanimity.
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing?
What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing
the MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power,
but a power of making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE
power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes,
but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and
collect taxes? What are the propermeans of executing such a power,
but NECESSARY and PROPER laws?
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test
by which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained
of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay
and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws NECESSARY
and PROPER for the execution of that power; and what does the
unfortunate and culumniated provision in question do more than
declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature,
to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously
given, might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY
and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations
thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the
immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the
most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon
the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result,
in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution.
And it is EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping
clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the national
legislature to pass all NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is
any thing exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific
powers upon which this general declaration is predicated. The
declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology
or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer
is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and
to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might
hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimatb
authorities of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what
it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that
the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that
the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the
Union; and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal
a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have
been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident
from the cry which has been raised against it; as that very cry
betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth
which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare.
But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY
and PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers
of the Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well
and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the
declaratory clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the
national government, like every other, must judge, in the first
instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents
in the last. If the federal government should overpass the just
bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers,
the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard
they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury
done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence
justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must
always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it
is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority
(which, indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature
should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State, would
it not be evident that, in making such an attempt, it had exceeded
its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State? Suppose,
again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its revenues,
it should undertake to abrogate a landtax imposed by the authority
of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an
invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species
of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the
State governments? If there ever should be a doubt on this head,
the credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who,
in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the convention,
have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to obscure the
plainest and simplest truths.
But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME
LAW of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or
what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It
is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning
of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to
whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from
every political association. If individuals enter into a state
of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator
of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into
a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact,
pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must
necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the individuals
of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty,
dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a goverment,
which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY.
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the large
society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers,
but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller
societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will
be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated
as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which declares the
supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just
before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately
and necessarily from the institution of a federal government.
It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY
confines this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION;
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention;
since that limitation would have been to be understood, though
it had not been expressed.
Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United
States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally
be opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing
the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless
upon imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the
land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution.
As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same object
might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious,
this would be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority
or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise
of power by one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous
to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual
interest would dictate a concert in this respect which would
avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from the whole
is, that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution,
retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue
to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind
of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be
shown in the next paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in
the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for
an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power,
of the State authority to that of the Union.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 34 -->
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