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Federalist No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet.
Friday, December 28, 1787.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought
to possess the power of providing for the support of the national
forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the
expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets,
and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements
and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the
jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily
be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support
of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts
contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all
those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national
treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in
the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in
one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle
of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion,
and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete
power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of
it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may
be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution.
From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue;
either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as
a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public
wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and,
in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in
other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his
subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is
that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage
the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them
the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies
and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government
of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching
nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of
the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities
in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities
of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose
in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the
pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous
principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have
frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose
that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to
ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their
judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions,
if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional
sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question
the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising
the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though
this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of
such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union;
though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet
in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue
to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain
dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the
consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge
of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and
has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries.
It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation,
which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves,
and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change
of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious
and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute
can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that
of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues
by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered
constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with
plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point
out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences
and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies
of the public treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit
the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission
by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL
taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments;
the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather
duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing
to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would
violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates
that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and
would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage
to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor
or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or
would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of
the Union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign
and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately
impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit
could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties
will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter
ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale,
would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities
admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle,
more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for
them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe
it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of
mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES
OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT
LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions
upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this
system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend
upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have
carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have
been exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these
papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national
interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency,
whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the
Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the
federal head and its members, and between the members themselves.
Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied
in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore
been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that
if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably
less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who
contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to
be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude
that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs
at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends
of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of
government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety.
How is it possible that a government half supplied and always
necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can
provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support
the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either
energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or
respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing
else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful?
How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements
to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal
or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation
in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged.
We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising
from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for
the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus
circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct
of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience
that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh
resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would
it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already
appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the
State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be
avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would
prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that
it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that
at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the
extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations
the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans.
A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity
in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government
that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated
that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures
for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as
limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They
would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly
lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand
and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the
resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established
funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government
should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations
will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that
we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent,
will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union; the
other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without
difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation,
by its own authority, would enable the national government to
borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as
well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose
confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government
that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the
means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is
clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often
to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and
little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men
who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the
poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely
to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities
which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear
entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual
situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate
the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility,
inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 31 -->
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