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Federalist No. 29
Concerning the Militia
From the Daily Advertiser.
Thursday, January 10, 1788
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its
services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents
to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching
over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that
uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia
would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever
they were called into service for the public defense. It would
enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field
with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar
moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much
sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions
which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable
uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation
of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It
is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan
of the convention proposes to empower the Union ``to provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE
APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE
MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS.''
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition
to the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little
to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one
from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a
well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free
country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at
the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of
the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty,
an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care
the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible,
to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly
institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of
the militia in those emergencies which call for the military
arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense
with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot
avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the
latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain
method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions
upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked
that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution
for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate
in the execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that
military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is
a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared,
and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated
to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair
dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one
breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic
and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority
sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter,
fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds
it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all
laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers, would
include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the
officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws,
as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary
and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve
that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of
landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases
relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition
of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS
is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion
which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority
of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as
it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force
was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because
there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall
we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason
in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity
and judgment?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy,
we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself,
in the hands of the federal government. It is observed that select
corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may
be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What
plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the
national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far
from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object
to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified,
and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal
legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment,
I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse:
``The project of disciplining all the militia of the United
States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable
of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military
movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is
not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment
of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other
classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of
going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as
might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which
would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia,
would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public
inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from
the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating
upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short
of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States.
To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and
industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the
experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not
long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed
and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected,
it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course
of a year.
``But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must
be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter
of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as
soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of
the militia. The attention of the government ought particularly
to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate
extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service
in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be
possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready
to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require
it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments,
but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government
to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable
to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of
citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and
the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and
those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute
that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible
security against it, if it should exist.''
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety
from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger
and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on
the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the
idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a
loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether
to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of
rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices
at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we
may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?
What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling
with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them
in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What
reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power
in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to
command its services when necessary, while the particular States
are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS?
If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia
upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government,
the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of
the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt
that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating
influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution,
a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written
tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images,
exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes
``Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire''; discoloring and disfiguring
whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches
into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and
improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the
power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New
Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire,
of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay,
the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen
instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to
be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people;
at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from
their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican
contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be
transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness
of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this
rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any
conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible
truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine
of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no
army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon
to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose
of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen,
direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had
meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush
them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them
an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people?
Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous
and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation
of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they
usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort
the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning
people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries
or distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national
rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible
to believe that they would employ such preposterous means to
accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural
and proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be
marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the
republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was
frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course
of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal
end of our political association. If the power of affording it
be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no
danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of
a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements
of selfpreservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 30 -->
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