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Federalist No. 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may
be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the
less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States
are united under one government, there will be but one national
civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies,
there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided
for--and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive
with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole.
The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected
sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with
danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate
upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward
three confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another
of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States.
There is little probability that there would be a greater number.
According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise
an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great
Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of
such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government
less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which
has been proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a
State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy
of government and the same forms of administration which are
requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not
of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we
can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government
of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that
the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed
confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when
we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the
passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see
no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient
to perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil
power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing
its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce
itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement
of subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States
would be likely to be divided would require a government not
less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened
by another supposition, more probable than that which presents
us with three confederacies as the alternative to a general Union.
If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations,
in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different
States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion
they will most naturally league themselves under two governments.
The four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links
of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected
to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise
enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight
of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would
facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State
to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more
powerful combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles
to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong
inducements to join the Northern league. An active foreign commerce,
on the basis of her own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides
with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more
Southern States, from various circumstances, may not think themselves
much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They may
prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations
to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities.
Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection
so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier,
she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed
side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather
than towards the stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy.
This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders
of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania,
if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no
likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that
State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States
will be able to support a national government better than one
half, or one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection
must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed
plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,
however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will
appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil
lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily
be employed to guard the inland communication between the different
confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly
spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take
into view the military establishments which it has been shown
would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of
the several nations into which the States would be divided, we
shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious
to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue,
and liberty of every part.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 14 -->
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