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Federalist No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to
an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed,
in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations.
I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and,
perhaps, still more alarming kind--those which will in all probability
flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from
domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already in
some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more
particular and more full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited,
or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into
which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests
with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests
as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that
men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation
of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties
in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience
of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There
are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon
the collective bodies of society. Of this description are the
love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the
jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There
are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally
operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships
and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And
there are others, not less numerous than either of the former,
which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the
attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men
of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people,
have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed;
and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled
to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage
or personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment
of a prostitute, [1] at the
expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen,
attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the SAMNIANS.
The same man, stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS,
[2] another nation of Greece,
or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an
accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias, [3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to
be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state
in the purchase of popularity, [4]
or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive
author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian
annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various
vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the
ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown, [5] entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition
of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles
V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and
powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France,
contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard
of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which
he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if
there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project
of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose
intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female, [6] the petulance of another, [7] and the cabals of a third, [8] had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and
pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that
have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations
in the production of great national events, either foreign or
domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary
waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance
with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will themselves
recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a tolerable
knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights
to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that
agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate
the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which
has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a
DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts
would have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience,
in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or
designing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual
peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from
each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the
spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men,
and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often
kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never
be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each
other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate
a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true
interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they
in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been
found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a
more active and imperious control over human conduct than general
or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have
republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies?
Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter?
Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires
of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings?
Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses
of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular
and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations
are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence,
and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and
views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything
more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth
as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or
glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial
motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations,
as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion?
Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered
new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the
other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions,
be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two
of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were
they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the
neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better
than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage
and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor
in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried
her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of
Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of
ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states,
Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,
[9] which gave a deadly blow
to the power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts
and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of
Europe. They had furious contests with England for the dominion
of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable
of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has
been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the
wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous
instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular
as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities
of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged
their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to
their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests
of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between
the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe
in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English
against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice,
of a favorite leader, [10]
protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy,
and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the
court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great
measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of
supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular
branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and
navigation.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries,
whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own,
what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would
seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between
the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation?
Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance
of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of
an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident
to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful
dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for
the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the
other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy
empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national
dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere
from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt
of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances
in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions
in Massachusetts, declare--!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding
with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions
of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of
disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of
society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or
nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An
intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this
effect: ``NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies
of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league
in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the
differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret
jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at
the expense of their neighbors.'' [11]
This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests
the REMEDY.
PUBLIUS. 1.
Aspasia, vide ``Plutarch's Life of Pericles.''
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed
to have stolen some public gold, with the connivance of Pericles,
for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. P Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray,
comprehending the Emperor, the King of France, the King of Aragon,
and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide ``Principes des
Negociations'' par 1'Abbe de Mably.
Federalist No. 7 -->
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