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Federalist No. 5
The Same Subject Continued:
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal.
Author: John Jay
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the
UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit
our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts
from it: ``An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation
of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and
property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the
jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must
increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union
the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all
apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST
ALL ITS ENEMIES.'' ``We most earnestly recommend to you calmness
and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union
may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL
way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint
the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this
occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS
UNION.''
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and
divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that
nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength,
and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious
and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are
in general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons.
We may profit by their experience without paying the price which
it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that
the people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we
find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those
three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with
one another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect
to the continental nations was really the same, yet by the arts
and policy and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series of years
they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were
useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three
or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of
their being ``joined in affection'' and free from all apprehension
of different ``interests,'' envy and jealousy would soon extinguish
confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy,
instead of the general interests of all America, would be the
only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other
BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes
and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies
cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly
on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible
to form them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable,
yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such
equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend
to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress
in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy
and good management which would probably distinguish the government
of one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in
strength and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot
be presumed that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and
foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies
for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen
it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should
rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree
of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her
with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them
to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to
diminish her importance; and would also restrain them from measures
calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much
time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly
dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence
in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable
to them. Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing
is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious
jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite
the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America
which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does
it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might
often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields
and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those
in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as
they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust
one another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord,
jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place
us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless
wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen
are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and
defensive might be formed between these confederacies, and would
produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources,
which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable
state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain
were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their
forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will
be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with
foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions
and commodities are different and proper for different markets,
so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial
concerns must create different interests, and of course different
degrees of political attachment to and connection with different
foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that
the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be
at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would
be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance
so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be
easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled
with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,
neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests
and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different
sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more
natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one
another than from distant nations, and therefore that each of
them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the
aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers
by alliances between themselves. And here let us not forget how
much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports,
and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or
compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and
others make in the characters of allies, and what innovations
did they under the same character introduce into the governments
of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America
into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend
to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference
of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS.
Federalist No. 6 -->
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