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Federalist No. 1
General Introduction
For the Independent Journal.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the
subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate
on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences
nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and
welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an
empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It
has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved
to the people of this country, by their conduct and example,
to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection
and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for
their political constitutions on accident and force. If there
be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived
may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision
is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act
may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune
of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those
of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate
and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our
choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true
interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected
with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be
wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our
deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates
upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion
a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions
and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious
interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all
changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument,
and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments;
and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will
either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their
country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of
elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial
confederacies than from its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of
this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to
resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely
because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into
interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit
that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and
it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made
its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring
from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest
errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.
So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve
to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions,
see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side
of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,
if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to
those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right
in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this
respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always
sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer
principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal
animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more
laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who
support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were
there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could
be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at
all times, characterized political parties. For in politics,
as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes
by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by
persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to
be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen
in this as in all former cases of great national discussion.
A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose.
To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be
led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness
of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts
by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their
invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency
of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper
fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.
An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,
which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart,
will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale
bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will
be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant
of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be
infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the
other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government
is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation
of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never
be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks
behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people
than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness
and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the
former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction
of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have
overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have
begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;
commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an
eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against
all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision
in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions
other than those which may result from the evidence of truth.
You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the
general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly
to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that,
after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly
of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that
this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and
your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I
will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I
have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and
I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded.
The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall
not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must
remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will
be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least
be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following
interesting particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION
THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH
THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY
OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly,
THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE
PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO
PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give
a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have
made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your
attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to
prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved
on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State,
and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the
fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles
of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States
are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must
of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions
of the whole. [1] This doctrine
will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has
votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing
can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged
view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the
new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore
be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union,
the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State
will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly
constitute the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS. 1.
The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is
held out in several of the late publications against the new
Constitution.
Federalist No. 2 -->
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